Abstract Preferences are ubiquitous in real-life. Moreover, preferences can be of many kinds: qualitative, quantitative, conditional, positive or negative, to name a few. Our ultimate goal is to define and study formalisms that can model problems with both constraints and many kind of preferences, possibly defined by several agents, and to develop tools to solve such problems efficiently. In this paper we briefly report on our recent work towards this goal.
Motivation and main goal
Constraints (Dechter, 2003; Rossi et al., 2006a) are requirements that we may state over the possible scenarios, and they must be met, otherwise we are not satisfied. Many scenarios can meet the given constraints, and they are all equally good, since they all satisfy the constraints. On the other hand, if a scenario does not satisfy some of the constraints, it is not acceptable. For example, when choosing a camera, we may be interested only in those that have a certain lens, and don't care about the other features. If a shop does not have cameras with that lens, then we would not buy a camera there. On the other hand, preferences are a way to model the fact that some scenarios are more desirable than others.
Preferences are ubiquitous in real life. In fact, as in the above example, most problems are over-constrained and would not be solvable if we insist that all their requirements are strictly met. Moreover, solvable problems have solutions with different desirability. Finally, many problems are more naturally described via preferences rather than hard statements. For example, when choosing a menu at the restaurant, we may prefer red wine to beer when eating meat, but pizza and beer may be more desirable than pizza and wine.
In some cases it could be more natural to express preferences in quantitative terms, as in "I like this at level 10 and that at level 20", while in other situations it could be better to use qualitative statements, as in "I like this more than that". Moreover, preferences can be unconditional, as in "I like a red car more than a blue car", or conditional, as in "If the car is convertible, I like it red more than blue". Furthermore, in many real life problems, constraints and preferences of various kinds may coexist. For example, in a product configuration problem, the producer may impose some constraints (for example, that no red cars are available at the moment) and may also add some marketing preferences, (for example, that it would be better to sell the white cars first), while the user may have preferences of various kind (for example, that he prefers red to the other colors if it is a sport car, and that he prefers a convertible to a sedan).
Because of the ubiquitous presence of constraints and preferences in real life, representing and reasoning about preferences is an area of increasing interest in theoretical and applied AI. Unfortunately, there is no single formalism which allows all the different kinds of preferences to be specified efficiently and reasoned with effectively. For example, soft constraints (Bistarelli et al., 1997) are most suited for reasoning about constraints and quantitative preferences, while CP-nets (Boutilier et al., 2004a) are most suited for representing qualitative and possibly conditional preferences. Our ultimate goal is to define and study formalisms that can model problems with both constraints and many kind of preferences, and to develop tools to solve such problems efficiently. Moreover, we also want to be able to deal with scenarios where preferences are expressed by several agents, and preference aggregation is therefore needed to find the optimal outcomes.
To move towards this goal, we have first compared the expressive power of two preference formalisms, soft constraints and CP-nets, and we have studied solvers for problems modeled by CP-nets and constraints together. Then, we have studied bipolar preferences, which allow for preference compensation. Finally, we have considered multi-agent scenarios, where the goal is to aggregate preferences, of possibly different kinds, specified by different agents, and to do that efficiently and satisfying certain properties. We have shown that existing multi-agent theoretical results and techniques can be used and adapted to the preference formalisms we use to improve the handling of preferences in the context of several agents. In particular, social choice theory and game theory seem to provide many tools to help us improve preference reasoning.
Parts of this paper appeared already in (Rossi, 2005) .
2 Preference modeling frameworks: soft constraints and CP-nets
Soft constraints
Soft constraints (Bistarelli et al., 1997; Meseguer et al., 2006) model quantitative preferences by generalizing the traditional formalism of hard constraints. In a soft constraint, each assignment to the variables of a constraint is annotated with a level of its desirability, and the desirability of a complete assignment is computed by a combination operator applied to the local preference values. By choosing a specific combination operator and an ordered set of levels of desirability, we can select a specific class of soft constraints.
For example, in fuzzy constraints (Dubois et al., 1993 (Dubois et al., , 1994 (Dubois et al., , 1996a preferences are between 0 and 1 (with 1 better than 0), and min is the combination operator. Weighted CSPs instead have preferences over the integers, with higher integers denoting a lower preference, and with sum as the combination operator. Classical constraints are soft constraints where there are only two levels of preference (true and false), where true is better than false, and where the combination operator is logical and.
Given a set of soft constraints, an ordering is induced over the assignments of the variables of the problem, which can be partial or total, and can also have ties. Given two solutions, checking whether one is preferable to the other one is easy: we compute the desirability values of the two solutions and compare them in the preference order. However, finding an optimal solution for a soft constraint problem is a combinatorially difficult problem.
Many search techniques have been developed to solve specific classes of soft constraints, like fuzzy or weighted. However, all have an exponential worst case complexity. Systematic approaches, like backtracking search and constraint propagation, can be adapted to soft constraints. For example, backtracking search becomes branch and bound where the bounds are given by the preference levels in the constraints. Constraint propagation, which is very successful in pruning parts of the search tree in constraint solving, can also be generalized to certain classes of soft constraints. Soft constraints are also not good at representing conditional and/or qualitative preference statements.
CP-nets
CP-nets (Boutilier et al., 2004a ) (Conditional Preference networks) are a graphical model for compactly representing conditional and qualitative preference relations. They exploit conditional preferential independence by structuring a user's possibly complex preference ordering with the ceteris paribus assumption. CP-nets are sets of conditional ceteris paribus preference statements (cp-statements). For instance, the statement "I prefer red wine to white wine if meat is served" asserts that, given two meals that differ only in the kind of wine served and both containing meat, the meal with a red wine is preferable to the meal with a white wine.
CP-nets bear some similarity to Bayesian networks, as both utilize directed acyclic graphs where each node stands for a domain variable, and assume a set of features with finite, discrete domains (these play the same role as variables in soft constraints).
Given a CP-net, an ordering is induced over the set of assignments of its features. In general, such an ordering is a preorder (that is, reflexive and transitive).
Given an acyclic CP-net, finding an optimal assignment to its features can be done in linear time. However, for cyclic CP-nets, it becomes NPhard. Comparing two outcomes is NP-hard as well, even when the CP-net is acyclic.
Summarizing, CP-nets and soft constraints have complementary advantages and drawbacks. CP-nets allow one to represent conditional and qualitative preferences, but dominance testing is expensive. On the other hand, soft constraints allow to represent both hard constraints and quantitative preferences, and have a cheap dominance testing.
Comparing their expressive power
It would be very useful to have a single formalism for representing preferences that have the good features of both soft constraints and CP-nets. To achieve this goal, we may start by comparing their expressive power.
We could say that a formalism B is at least as expressive as a formalism A if from a problem expressed using A it is possible to build in polynomial time a problem expressed using B such that the optimal solutions are the same.
If we apply this definition to soft constraints, we see, for example, that fuzzy CSPs and weighted CSPs are at least as expressive as classical constraints. If instead we we use this definition to compare CP-nets and soft constraints, we see that hard constraints are at least as expressive as CPnets. In fact, it is possible to show that, given any CP-net, we can obtain in polynomial time a set of hard constraints whose solutions are the optimal outcomes of the CP-net. Thus, if we are only interested in the best solutions, CP-nets are not more expressive than hard constraints. This is useful to know, since it means that we can use the classical constraint-based machinery to find the optimal solutions of a CP-net.
It also means that soft constraints, which are more expressive than hard ones, are more expressive than CP-nets. Even hard constraints are more expressive than CP-nets. In fact, there are some hard constraint problems for which it is not possible to find in polynomial time a CP-net with the same set of optimals. This derives from the fact that not all solution orderings can be expressed via a CP-net. In fact, solutions which differ for just the value of one variable must be ordered, while in a constraint problem they could be equally valued (that is, both acceptable or both unacceptable).
However, we could be more fine-grained in the comparison, and say that a formalism B is at least as expressive than a formalism A iff from a problem expressed using A it is possible to build in polynomial time a problem expressed using B such that the orderings over solutions are the same. If we compare soft constraints and CP-nets by using this definition, then it is possible to see that CP-nets and soft (or hard) constraints are incomparable.
Ordering approximations
However, it is possible to approximate a CP-net ordering via soft constraints, achieving tractability of dominance testing while sacrificing precision to some degree (Domshlak et al., 2003 (Domshlak et al., , 2006 Kaci and Prade, 2007) . Different approximations can be characterized by how much of the original ordering they preserve, the time complexity of generating the approximation, and the time complexity of comparing outcomes in the approximation.
It is vital that such approximations are information preserving; that is, what is ordered in the given ordering is also ordered in the same way in the approximation. Another desirable property of approximations is that they preserve the ceteris paribus property.
In (Domshlak et al., 2003) we have approximated CP-nets via soft constraints where the optimization criteria is the minimization of the sum of the preferences, and also via soft constraints where a lexicographic ordering is adopted. In both cases, the approximation is information preserving and satisfies the ceteris paribus property.
Constraints and preferences together
What about CP-nets and hard constraints together? Many problems have both constraints and qualitative and/or quantitative preferences. Unfortunately, reasoning with them both is difficult as often the most preferred outcome is not feasible, and not all feasible outcomes are equally preferred.
For example, consider a constrained CP-net, which is a CP-net plus a set of hard constraints. This structure allows to model both qualitative conditional preferences and hard constraints. Its optimal outcomes (called "feasible Pareto optimals" in (Boutilier et al., 2004b) ) are all the outcomes which are feasible and not dominated in the CP-net by any other feasible outcome. It is possible to obtain all such optimal outcomes by just solving a set of hard constraints (Prestwich et al., 2005) . In well defined cases, this avoids expensive dominance testing. If we want to avoid dominance testing completely, we can do that at the price of obtaining a superset of the feasible Pareto optimals by hard constraint solving. A similar constraintbased procedure can be used also when we add soft constraints to a CP-net.
Bipolar preferences
Whether they are conditional, qualitative, or quantitative, preferences often are of one of two kinds: positive or negative. A positive preference expresses a degree of desire, and a negative one expresses a level of unsatisfaction for a feature of an object. Preferences expressing both degrees of desire and levels of unsatisfaction are often called bipolar.
Bipolarity is an important topic in several domains, such as psychology, multi-criteria decision making, and more recently in AI (argumentation (Amgound et al. , 2005) and qualitative reasoning (Benferhat et al., 2002; Benferarth et al., 2006; Dubois and Fargier, 2005; Dubois and fargier, 2006) ) and in decision theory (Labreuche and Grabish, 2006) . In many real-life or artificial situations agents express what they like and what they dislike, thus often preferences are bipolar.
Positive and negative preferences could be thought as two symmetric concepts, and thus one could think that they can be dealt with via the same operators. However, it is easy to see that this would not model what one usually expects in real scenarios.
For example, when we have a scenario with two objects A and B, if we like both A and B, then the overall scenario should be more preferred than having just A or B alone. On the other hand, if we don't like A nor B, then we expect that the preference of the scenario should be smaller than the preferences of A or B alone. In fact, usually combination of positive preferences should produce a higher (positive) preference, while combination of negative preferences should give us a lower (negative) preference.
When dealing with both kinds of preferences, it is natural to express also indifference, which means that we express neither a positive nor a negative preference over an object. For example, we may say that we like peaches, we don't like bananas, and we are indifferent to apples. Then, a desired behavior of indifference is that, when combined with any preference (either positive or negative), it should not influence the overall preference. For example, if we like peaches and we are indifferent to apples, a dish with peaches and apples should have overall a positive preference.
Besides combining preferences of the same type, one may want also to be able to combine positive with negative preferences. We strongly believe that the most natural and intuitive way to do so is to allow for compensation. Comparing positive against negative aspects and compensating them w.r.t. their strength is one of the core features of decision-making processes, and it is, undoubtedly, a tactic universally applied to solve many real life problems.
For example, if we have a meal with meat (which we like very much) and wine (which we don't like), then what should be the preference of the meal? To know that, we should be able to compensate the positive preference given to meat with the negative preference given to wine. The expected result is a preference which is between the two, and which should be positive if the positive preference is "stronger" than the negative one.
Positive and negative preferences might seem as just two different criteria to reason with, and thus techniques such as those usually adopted by multi-criteria optimization could appear suitable for dealing with them. However, this interpretation would hide the fundamental nature of bipolar preferences, that is, positive preferences are naturally opposite of negative preferences. Moreover, in multi-criteria optimization it is often reasonable to use a Pareto-like approach, thus associating tuples of values to each solution, and comparing solutions according to tuple dominance. Instead, in bipolar problems, it would be very unnatural to force such an approach in all contexts, or to associate to a solution a preference which is neither a positive nor a negative one (and not even the indifference element).
Soft constraints and CP-nets are useful formalisms to model problems with quantitative preferences. However, they can only model one kind of preferences. Technically, soft constraints can model just negative preferences, since in this framework preference combination returns lower preferences, which, as mentioned above, is natural when using negative preferences.
This means that the soft constraint formalism based on semirings can be used to model negative preferences. A different algebraic structure is then needed to model positive preferences.
To model bipolar problems, we can link these two structures and we set the highest negative preference to coincide with the lowest positive preference to model indifference. A compensation operator between positive and negative preferences is then needed to model preference compensation.
A desirable property of compensation, that unfortunately often does not hold, is associativity. Non-associativity of preference compensation occurs in many contexts, thus we think it is too restrictive to focus just on associative environments. For example, non-associativity of compensation arises when either positive or negative preferences are aggregated with an idempotent operator (such as min or max), while compensation is instead non-idempotent (such as sum). Also compensative idempotent operators between min and max (such as the arithmetic mean) are almost never associative (Dubois and Prade, 1985) . We developed a framework for modeling and solving bipolar preference problems, which allows for (but does not force) non-associativity of preference compensation, since we want to give complete freedom to choose the positive and negative algebraic structures (Pini et al., 2006a) . However, we also describe a technique that, given a negative preference structure, builds a corresponding positive preference structure and an associative compensation operator. Bipolar preference problems can be solved by suitable adapting both constraint propagation and branch and bound techniques.
Multi-agent preference aggregation
In many situations, we need to represent and reason about the simultaneous preferences of several agents over the same objects. To aggregate the agents' preferences, which in general express a partial order over the possible outcomes, we can query each agent in turn and collect together the results. We can see this as each agent "voting" whether an outcome dominates another. We can thus obtain different semantics by collecting these votes together in different ways.
In (Rossi et al., 2004a) we considered this scenario assuming that each agent uses a (partial) CP-net to express its preferences. For example, to obtain a Pareto-like semantics, we can say that an outcome A is better than another one, B, iff every agent says that A is better than B or that they are indifferent. An alternative criterion, that we may call majority, is that A is better than B iff a majority of the agents who are not indifferent vote in favor. A weaker criterion, that we may call Max, is that more agents vote in favor than against or for incomparability. Sometimes it is reasonable to assume that the agents are ordered in importance. If the first agent orders two outcomes then this is reflected in the final outcome. However, if they are indifferent between two outcomes, we consult the second agent, and so on. We say that A is lexicographically better than B iff there exists some distinguished agent such that all agents higher in the order are indifferent between A and B, and the distinguished agent votes for A.
Fairness
Having cast our preference aggregation semantics in terms of voting, it is appropriate to ask if classical results about voting theory apply. For example, what about Arrow's theorem (Kelly, 1978) , which states the impossibility of a fair voting system? Can we fairly combine together the preferences of the individual agents?
In short, Arrow's theorem states that no voting system with two or more agents and which totally orders three or more candidates can be fair. More precisely, no voting system can be free, transitive, independent to irrelevant alternatives, monotonic and non-dictatorial.
Observe that in our context each agent can express both ordering and incomparability between two alternatives. The same would hold also if the agents used soft constraints rather than CP-nets. By comparison, the votes in an election express a total order without incomparability. As a result, Arrow's theorem does not immediately apply.
Before adapting Arrow's theorem to our scenario, let us consider the issue of fairness in more general terms, by assuming a scenario where each agent models its preferences via a partial order, and the ordering resulting from preference aggregation can be partial as well. Despite social welfare theory seldom considers partially ordered preferences, the possibility of using partial orders, both in the agents' orders and in the resulting order, can be easily justified. In fact, incomparability is a useful mechanism to resolve conflict when aggregating such preferences. If half of the agents prefer A to B and the other half prefer B to A, then it may be best to say that A and B are incomparable. In addition, an agent's preferences are not necessarily total. For example, while it is easy and reasonable to compare two white wines, it may be difficult to compare a red wine and a white wine. We may wish simply to declare them incomparable. Moreover, an agent may have several possibly conflicting preference criteria she wants to follow, and their combination can naturally lead to a partial order. It is thus reasonable to assume that both the preferences of an agent and the result of preference aggregation can be a partial order.
The definition of fairness considered by Arrow consists of the following desirable properties:
• Unanimity: if all agents agree that A is preferable to B, then the resulting order must agree as well.
• Independence to irrelevant alternatives: the ordering between A and B in the result depends only on the relation between A and B given by the agents.
• Monotonicity: whenever an agent moves up the position of one outcome in her ordering, then (all else being equal) such an outcome cannot move down in the result.
• Absence of a dictator: a dictator is an agent such that, no matter what the others say, will always dictate the resulting ordering among the outcomes.
We have shown that, under certain conditions, it is impossible for a preference aggregation system over partially ordered preferences to be fair Pini et al., 2008) . By moving from total orders to partial orders, we expect to enrich greatly our ability to combine preferences fairly. In fact, we can use incomparability to resolve conflict and thereby not contradict agents. Nevertheless, under the conditions identified, we still do not escape the reach of Arrow's theorem. Even if we are only interested in the most preferred outcomes of the aggregated preferences, it is still impossible to be fair.
Non-manipulability
Of course fairness is just one of the desirable properties for preference aggregations. Other interesting properties are related to the nonmanipulability (also called strategy-proofness) of a preference aggregation system: it should not be possible for agents to manipulate the election by voting strategically. Strategic voting is when agents express preferences which are different from their real ones, to get the result they want. If this is possible, then the preference aggregation rule is said to be manipulable.
For social choice rules on totally ordered preferences, the Gibbard Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973 ) proves that it is not possible to be at same time non-manipulable and have no dictators. Either there is a dictator (that is, an agent who gets what he wants by voting sincerely) or a manipulator (that is, an agent who gets what he wants by lying). In either case, there is an agent who gets what he wants no matter what the other agents say. This is clearly undesirable.
We extended this result to partially ordered preferences (Pini et al., 2006b (Pini et al., , 2008 . Even in this more general case, we prove that it is impossible for a social choice function to have no dictator and be non-manipulable at the same time. As with total orders, we conjecture that there will be ways around this negative result. For example, it may be that certain social choice functions on partial orders are computationally hard to manipulate. As another example, it may be that certain restrictions on the way agents vote (like single-peaked preferences for total orders) guarantee strategyproofness.
Incompleteness
In a multi-agent context, some agents may decide to not reveal some of their preferences, because of privacy reasons. A pair of outcomes can thus be ordered, incomparable, in a tie, or the relationship between them may not be specified.
Notice that incomparability and incompleteness represent very different concepts. Outcomes may be incomparable because the agent does not wish very dissimilar outcomes to be compared. For example, we might not want to compare a biography with a novel as the criteria along which we judge them are just too different. Outcomes can also be incomparable because the agent has multiple criteria to optimize. For example, we might not wish to compare a faster but more expensive laptop with a slower and cheaper one. Incompleteness, on the other hand, represents simply an absence of knowledge about the relationship between certain pairs of outcomes. Incompleteness arises naturally when we have not fully elicited an agent's preferences or when agents have privacy concerns which prevent them revealing their complete preference ordering.
How do we modify preference aggregation functions to deal with incompleteness? One possibility is to consider all possible ways in which the incomplete preference orders can be consistently completed.In each possible completion, preference aggregation may give different optimal elements (or winners). This leads to the idea of the possible winners (those outcomes which are winners in at least one possible completion) and the necessary winners (those outcomes which are winners in all possible completions) (Konczak and Lang, 2005) .
Possible and necessary winners have been shown to be useful in many scenarios, including preference elicitation. In fact, elicitation is over when the set of possible winners coincides with that of the necessary winners (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002) . In addition, preference elicitation can focus just on the incompleteness concerning those outcomes which are possible and necessary winners. We can ignore completely all other outcomes.
Computing the set of possible and necessary winners is in general a difficult problem. However, we identify sufficient conditions that assure tractability . Such conditions concern properties of the preference aggregation function, such as monotonicity and independence to irrelevant alternatives (Arrow et al., 2002) , which are desirable and natural properties to require. We also studied this problem in the context of a specific voting rule (sequential majority voting), proving that for this rule it is easy to compute such winners, unless we put a restriction on the sequence of knock-out competitions performed by the rule (Lang et al., 2007) .
Further issues in preference reasoning
Besides the issues discussed above, we have also followed several other lines of research, related to preferences. In the rest of this section we will briefly outline the main results we have obtained in such lines, or what we intend to pursue in the near future.
Learning preferences. It is usually hard for a user to describe the correct preferences for his real-life problem. This is especially true for soft constraints, which do not have an intuitive graphical representation. We have shown that the use of learning techniques can greatly help in this respect, allowing users to state preferences both on entire solutions and subsets of the variables (Rossi and Sperduti, 2004) .
Preferences and uncertainty. Preferences can be seen as a way to describe some kind of uncertainty. When we are not sure about what should be allowed and what should be forbidden, we can pass from hard constraints to soft constraints, and use several levels of satisfiability. However, there is also uncertainty which comes from lack of data, or from events which are under Nature's control. Fortunately, in the presence of both preferences and uncertainty in the context of temporal constraints, we can reason with the same complexity as if we just had preferences (Rossi et al., 2004b; Khatib et al., 2007; Rossi et al., 2006b) .
Many approaches to deal with uncertainty are based on possibility theory (Dubois and Prade, 1988a,b; Dubois et al., 2006b; Dubois and Prade, 1999; Dubois et al., 2001 ). While probabilities are useful when we have data, but they are variable, possibilities are useful when we reason under incomplete information. Technically, possibilities (and necessity) provide upper (and lower) bounds to probabilities.
The handling of the coexistence of preferences and uncertainty via possibility theory allows for a natural merging of the two notions and leads to several promising semantics for ordering the solutions according to both their preference and their robustness to uncertainty .
Preference formalisms and strategic games. The notion of optimality naturally arises in many areas of applied mathematics and computer science concerned with decision making. When dealing with preferences, it is natural to ask for the optimal solutions according to the preferences. There are many areas in which preferences are considered. For example, strategic games are one of them. Strategic games are used to capture the idea that agents interact with each other while pursuing their own interests.
It is interesting to relate the notions of optimality in soft constraints, CP nets, and strategic games (Apt et al., 2008b) . To relate the notion of optimality of CP nets to that in strategic games, in (Apt et al., 2006) we introduce a qualitative modification of the notion of a strategic game. We show then that the optimal outcomes of a CP-net are exactly the Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic game in the above sense. This allows us to use the techniques of game theory to search for optimal outcomes of CP-nets and vice-versa, to use techniques developed for CPnets to search for Nash equilibria of the considered games.
We also compare the notion of optimality used in soft constraints to that used in strategic games (Apt et al., 2008a) , by means of two mappings. We show, for a natural mapping from soft constraints to strategic games, that in general no relation exists between the notions of an optimal solution and Nash equilibrium. However, for a class of soft constraints that includes weighted constraints, every optimal solution is a Nash equilibrium. In turn, for a natural mapping from strategic games to soft constraints, the notion that coincides with optimality for soft constraints is that of Pareto efficient joint strategy.
Conclusions
Much work has been done in the last years to model and solve problems with preferences. However, much remains to be done in order to achieve the ultimate goal of a single environment where most kind of preferences, singleagent or multi-agent, can be modeled and then efficiently dealt with. We think that our results constitute an interesting contribution to this research area, and we hope that, starting from them, many other significant results can be obtained. 
